Section 609.605 is a collection of different trespass offenses

Minnesota’s general trespass statute lists eleven misdemeanor clauses, protected-shelter trespass, school and school-bus provisions, and a gross-misdemeanor agricultural-biosecurity offense. Separate statutes cover critical public-service infrastructure and outdoor-recreation entry.

The familiar clause is subdivision 1(b)(3): a person intentionally trespasses on another’s premises and, without claim of right, refuses to depart on demand of the lawful possessor. It generally concerns remaining after a present demand.

Clauses 7 and 8 concern returning. Clause 7 requires a return after notice plus an intent to abuse, disturb, cause distress in, or threaten another. Clause 8 prohibits return within one year after the person was told to leave and not return, absent claim of right or authorized consent.

Clause 4 does not require a demand to leave. It covers intentional occupancy or entry into another’s dwelling or locked or properly posted building, without claim of right or authorized consent, except in an emergency. Other clauses address produce, closed cemeteries, construction and aggregate-mining sites, boundary markers, animals, and police cordons.

A complaint should cite the exact subdivision and clause. If it merely says “trespass,” demand, notice, posting, authority, claim of right, consent, location, and intent can be obscured.

Refusing a lawful demand to leave is not the same as entering without permission

Subdivision 1(b)(3) generally requires proof that the accused intentionally trespassed on another’s premises, lacked a claim of right, received a demand to depart from the lawful possessor, and refused.

A person can enter a business, lobby, home, event, or other property with initial permission and later become a trespasser when permission is revoked. The criminal focus may be the refusal to leave, not the original entry.

The State should prove an understandable demand and a meaningful refusal. Ambiguous statements such as “maybe you should go,” conflicting directions from staff, inaudible commands, language barriers, disability, or immediate efforts to collect belongings can affect whether there was an intentional refusal.

The law does not guarantee unlimited time. A person must act reasonably promptly after a clear lawful demand. But video may show that the person was moving toward the exit, awaiting a safe route, retrieving a child, seeking mobility assistance, paying a bill, or complying when arrested.

“Premises” means real property and appurtenant buildings or structures. The State must identify the property boundary and show the demand came from the lawful possessor or an authorized person. A stranger’s personal objection does not automatically revoke another person’s permission.

Returning within one year requires a legally sufficient earlier warning

Clause 8 applies when a person intentionally returns to another’s property within one year after being told to leave the property and not return, while lacking claim of right or new consent from someone authorized to give it.

The one-year period runs from the qualifying notice. The State should prove the date, property, person who gave notice, authority, exact substance, receipt, later return date, and absence of reinstated consent.

A later invitation can matter. A tenant, owner, manager, school official, or other authorized person may grant consent depending on the property and scope of authority. A casual invitation from someone without control may not override a valid exclusion.

Clause 7 has an added intent element: the person returns after being told to leave and not return with intent to abuse, disturb, cause distress in, or threaten another. The prosecution must prove that intent, not infer it solely from presence.

Notice for one store, building, parcel, campus, or event does not automatically extend to every property associated with a company or government. The geographic scope must be communicated and legally supportable. Parking lots, common areas, public sidewalks, adjoining businesses, and leased spaces may have different possessors.

A valid no-return warning must communicate both required commands

In State v. Kremmin, 889 N.W.2d 318, 320–22 (Minn. App. 2017), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that clause 8 requires proof the defendant was told both to leave and not return. Evidence that the property holder said never to return, without proof of the leave command, was insufficient.

The precedential decision In re Welfare of A.A.D., 977 N.W.2d 666, 670–72 (Minn. App. 2022), applied that language strictly. An officer’s statement, “You’re officially trespassed,” did not tell the visitor to leave and not return. An unsuccessful attempt to hand over a written notice the visitor would not accept also did not satisfy the statutory requirement that the person be “told.”

A formal paper is not always necessary, but exact language and receipt matter. Body camera, surveillance, audio, signed notices, certified mail, email records, and credible testimony can establish notice. A form prepared but never delivered does not prove communication.

The notice should identify the property and duration. A warning can be broader than the speaker lawfully controls or too vague to support criminal liability. The fact that a business database says “banned” does not independently prove the required oral or written commands reached the defendant.

Clause 3 is different. It concerns refusal after a present demand to depart and does not require a prior one-year notice. Confusing the clauses can alter the elements and jury instructions.

The demand must come from a lawful possessor or authorized person

Ownership is not always necessary. A tenant, lessee, manager, authorized employee, event operator, or government official may be the lawful possessor or act for one. The question is control of the specific premises and authority to revoke access.

A retail employee’s authority may depend on job role and company policy, although apparent responsibility for the premises can support an inference. A security contractor should be connected to the owner or occupant through testimony, contract, policy, or circumstances.

In apartments, a tenant ordinarily controls the leased dwelling and may invite guests. A landlord’s power to exclude a tenant’s guest can be limited by lease rights, common-area rules, court orders, and safety concerns. One cotenant’s invitation and another’s objection can create difficult consent questions.

At public facilities, authority can arise from statutes, regulations, posted hours, conduct rules, limited-access designations, or delegated management responsibility. Public ownership does not make every office, secure floor, or closed meeting open to unrestricted entry.

The State must connect the speaker to the property. A police officer can relay a lawful possessor’s demand, enforce a valid restriction, or control a lawfully cordoned scene. Police status alone does not make the officer lawful possessor of every private parcel.

Claim of right and consent can defeat essential elements

“Claim of right” generally concerns a good-faith property or possessory right—such as owner, tenant, lessee, licensee, or invitee status. The State bears the ultimate burden of proving the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

A claim can be honest yet mistaken. Deeds, leases, easements, court orders, boundary surveys, access agreements, employment duties, membership rules, and longstanding use may support it. A bare assertion created after arrest is less persuasive than contemporaneous evidence.

Consent may be express or implied. A store invites customers during business hours, a ticket grants event access subject to conditions, and a resident may invite a visitor. Consent can be limited by area, time, purpose, behavior, or revocation.

Consent from one authorized person can conflict with a restriction imposed by another. The defense should identify who controlled the particular place at that time, the scope of each person’s authority, and what the accused reasonably understood.

Claim of right does not permit self-help in every ownership dispute. A former tenant, separated spouse, employee, contractor, or co-owner may have some property interest but no present right to enter a particular dwelling or restricted area. Civil remedies and court orders may be required.

Entering a dwelling or locked or posted building can be trespass without a demand

Clause 4 covers intentional occupancy or entry into another’s dwelling or a locked or properly posted building without claim of right or authorized consent, except in an emergency situation.

A “dwelling” is a building or part used as a residence full-time or part-time. It can be part of a multiunit or multipurpose building or a manufactured home. A seasonal cabin, hotel room while occupied, apartment, or separately used residential portion may qualify depending on facts.

For a non-dwelling building, the statute’s locked-or-posted requirement matters. “Posted” generally requires a sign at least 8.5 by 11 inches, conspicuously placed on the building exterior or property and carrying a general trespass warning.

A sign inside an unseen room, tiny sticker, obstructed notice, or warning on a different entrance may not meet the definition. A locked door, gate, window, or access system can independently support the locked-building theory. Evidence should show the condition when entry occurred.

The emergency exception is express. A person seeking immediate refuge, medical aid, fire response, rescue, or protection may have entered because of an emergency. The nature, urgency, alternatives, scope, and duration of entry matter.

Mistaken address, open house, delivery error, intoxication, or sleepwalking does not automatically establish a defense, but it can negate intentional entry or awareness of the unwarranted intrusion.

Stores, apartment buildings, hotels, hospitals, and public facilities

A business open to the public gives conditional permission to enter for ordinary business. Permission can be revoked for disruption, policy violations, suspected theft, harassment, closing time, or other lawful reasons. The charge still requires the elements of the selected clause.

Store signage saying management may refuse service does not itself prove a personalized demand or one-year warning. Surveillance should show the words, response, exit opportunity, and later return. Loss-prevention records should be authenticated.

Apartment common areas can be controlled by the owner while individual units are controlled by tenants. A guest invited by a resident may have a claim of right to reach the unit, subject to valid lease rules, protective orders, building exclusions, and revocation.

Hotels distinguish lobby access from a rented room and staff-only areas. A guest’s license can end at checkout or upon lawful termination, but disputes over payment, belongings, accessibility, and notice may affect intent and refusal.

Hospitals and clinics can restrict treatment areas, staff spaces, or disruptive visitors while retaining duties to patients. A person’s need for care does not authorize access to every area, and an exclusion should not be confused with medical screening obligations.

Government buildings may have public lobbies, courtrooms, service counters, secure offices, and closed areas. Public ownership is relevant but not a universal claim of right. Access rules and constitutional limits require location-specific analysis.

Speech, protest, recording, and trespass are related but separate questions

The First Amendment can protect speech on public sidewalks and in designated or traditional public forums. It does not ordinarily create a right to remain on private property after lawful permission is revoked.

Private shopping areas, clinics, offices, and event venues can invite the public for business without becoming unlimited public forums. A protester may have a message protected from government censorship but no right to deliver it inside private premises.

At government property, forum classification, purpose of the space, viewpoint neutrality, reasonableness, meeting rules, closing hours, and conduct can matter. A valid order based on disruption or access limits is different from an exclusion imposed solely to suppress a disfavored viewpoint.

Recording police or officials in a place the person may lawfully occupy can receive constitutional protection. That protection does not authorize entry into secure areas, obstruction, refusal to comply with neutral restrictions, or remaining after a lawful exclusion.

A criminal case can therefore present both statutory and constitutional defenses: no valid demand, claim of right, no intentional refusal, selective enforcement, retaliation, overbreadth, or viewpoint discrimination. The defense should preserve video and the policy actually applied.

Schools and school buses have specialized trespass rules

Subdivision 4 generally makes it a misdemeanor to enter or be found in a public or nonpublic elementary, middle, or secondary school building unless the person is an enrolled student, parent or guardian of an enrolled student, employee, invited or permitted by a school official, attending an invited event, class, or meeting, or properly reported as a visitor.

Being on a school roof without permission is a misdemeanor. A group of three or more entering or found in a school building without one member satisfying a listed authorization can face gross-misdemeanor treatment.

A person who returns to school property within one year after the principal or designee told the person to leave and not return commits a misdemeanor unless later given permission. The school-specific language should be charged and proved rather than importing assumptions from the general clause.

School officials with reasonable cause may detain a suspected violator reasonably while awaiting police, and officers receive a limited four-hour warrantless-arrest provision. Reasonableness, timing, force, and probable cause remain reviewable.

Subdivision 4a covers a person who boards an operating school bus or one containing pupils and refuses the operator’s demand to leave. The State must prove the bus status, boarding, demand, and refusal.

Protected shelters and transitional housing carry gross-misdemeanor exposure

Subdivision 2 applies when a person trespasses on the grounds of a facility providing emergency shelter services for domestic-abuse victims, comparable services for sex-trafficking victims, or transitional housing for those victims and their children, without claim of right or authorized consent, and refuses a demand to depart.

The 2026 statute expressly includes facilities serving sex-trafficking victims and comparable transitional housing. The law effective on the incident date controls, especially for conduct around the amendment.

The State must prove the facility fits the statutory category, the relevant grounds, lack of claim or consent, a demand by one with authority, and refusal. Confidentiality and safety concerns do not eliminate the burden of proof.

A resident’s invitation can raise authority and policy questions. Shelters may impose controlled-access rules that limit resident invitations to protect confidential locations. The defense should obtain the applicable policy without endangering residents.

Because the offense is a gross misdemeanor, collateral consequences and custody exposure are greater than ordinary trespass. Related protective-order, stalking, assault, or privacy charges may be investigated separately.

Agricultural land, construction sites, mines, cemeteries, and police cordons

Entering posted commercial livestock or animal-production premises without owner or lawful-occupant consent is a gross misdemeanor under subdivision 5. A qualifying biosecurity sign must be at least 11 inches square, conspicuous at each roadway entrance, and provide biosecurity notice such as “No entrance beyond this point without authorization.”

Locked or posted construction sites receive a separate misdemeanor clause. The statute specifies sign size, placement, and additional signs based on acreage. A business licensee, including specified labor or management representatives, is excepted.

Aggregate-mining sites have their own posting definition: conspicuous signs at intervals of 500 feet or less, two-inch letters, general warning, and a statement that Minnesota law prohibits trespass. A generic distant sign may not satisfy it.

Entering a public or private cemetery without authorization during posted closed hours is a misdemeanor. Another clause covers entry with intent to take or injure growing fruit, fruit trees, or vegetables without permission.

Clause 11 prohibits intentional crossing into an area lawfully cordoned off by or at the direction of an on-duty peace officer. Tape, barriers, or other conspicuous means must identify the restriction and responsible authority. Officer permission is an affirmative defense.

Boundary-marker interference and allowing controlled domestic animals or fowl onto another’s land within a city are also included. They should not be analyzed as ordinary refusal-to-leave cases.

Critical public-service facilities, utilities, and pipelines use a separate statute

Minn. Stat. § 609.6055 (2026) protects critical public-service facilities, utilities, and pipelines. Definitions, posting, consent, and penalty rules differ from section 609.605.

Intentional unauthorized entry onto posted critical property is generally a misdemeanor. A person who enters with intent to significantly disrupt operations or damage property can face gross-misdemeanor treatment. Actual disruption, damage, or tampering can support felony-level liability under related provisions.

The statute contains detailed sign requirements and definitions for facilities such as electric power, water, telecommunications, rail, mass transit, ports, airports, and pipelines. The specific site and qualifying function must be established.

Employees, contractors, easement holders, regulators, emergency personnel, adjoining owners, and members of the public may have different access rights. Maps, work orders, identification, gates, easements, permits, and site policies can be decisive.

Protest activity near infrastructure can raise speech and assembly issues, but protected expression does not necessarily authorize entry onto restricted operational property. Police orders, property boundaries, public rights-of-way, and the precise conduct should be documented.

Hunting and outdoor-recreation trespass follow additional rules

Minn. Stat. § 97B.001 (2026) regulates entry for outdoor recreation, including hunting, fishing, trapping, boating, camping, and related activity. Its notice, agricultural-land, posting, and permission rules should be analyzed separately from criminal-code trespass.

Some agricultural land may not require posting before entry is prohibited, while other land requires signs or direct notice. On-the-ground assumptions about “open land” are risky. Plat maps, GPS apps, fencing, field edges, water access, easements, and actual property records can disagree.

A hunting license does not grant access to private land. Permission can be limited to a season, species, person, vehicle, or portion of property and can be revoked.

Retrieving wounded game, dogs, equipment, or vehicles can involve specific statutory duties and landowner communication. An emergency or conservation concern should be handled through lawful procedures rather than assumed entry authority.

Conservation officers may document tracks, stands, trail-camera images, GPS data, harvested animals, and statements. Preserve mapping data and the exact condition and placement of notices.

Trespass is not burglary, but the same entry can be investigated as both

Burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582 (2026) generally requires entering a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or entering without consent and committing a crime inside, with degree determined by dwelling status, presence, weapons, assault, and other circumstances.

Ordinary trespass does not require intent to commit another crime. That distinction often separates a misdemeanor from a serious felony.

The State may infer criminal intent from forced entry, concealment, tools, time, target, conduct inside, flight, or possession of property. Innocent entry, mistake, shelter seeking, consent, or a noncriminal purpose can contradict that inference.

Shoplifting does not automatically make a customer a burglar merely because store permission is conditional. Minnesota burglary law has its own “without consent” definition and case law. Charge stacking requires close analysis.

Trespass can be a lesser offense in some building-entry cases, but lesser-included status depends on the charged burglary theory and elements. Counsel should evaluate instructions, verdict forms, and multiple-punishment limits under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2026).

Video, warnings, property rights, and the leading notice cases

Useful evidence includes the complete security video, body camera, officer audio, 911 call, trespass form, delivery records, emails, account notes, policies, lease, deed, court orders, sign photographs, maintenance records, visitor logs, access-card data, maps, and witness testimony.

In Kremmin, 889 N.W.2d at 321–22, the court refused to rewrite “told to leave the property and not to return” as though only the second command mattered. The State must prove the statute the Legislature enacted.

In A.A.D., 977 N.W.2d at 670–72, “You’re officially trespassed” was insufficient because it did not contain either required command. The court also held that merely attempting to hand a written notice to a person who refused it did not establish that the person was told. Those holdings make exact recording and delivery evidence essential.

Clause 3 cases require a different record: a current demand and intentional refusal. Video can establish whether the person heard, understood, remained, moved toward an exit, or received conflicting instructions.

Photograph signs promptly. Size, text, visibility, number, entrance location, interval, lighting, obstruction, and date can be elements under specialized clauses. A replacement sign photographed after arrest does not prove the earlier condition.

Property authority should be documented rather than assumed. Corporate records, job duties, management agreements, leases, and testimony can identify the lawful possessor and who could consent or revoke consent.

Penalties, collateral consequences, and common defense issues

A misdemeanor carries up to 90 days in jail and a $1,000 fine. A gross misdemeanor carries up to 364 days and a $3,000 fine. Critical-infrastructure conduct, property damage, burglary, stalking, assault, protective-order violations, or obstructing legal process can increase exposure through separate charges.

Consequences can include probation, stay-away conditions, restitution for proven damage or response costs, employment or licensing problems, campus discipline, housing consequences, firearm-related conditions, and immigration concerns. A trespass notice can remain operational independently of the criminal case.

No intentional conduct. Mistake, confusion, inaccessible exit, medical event, disability, or prompt compliance can negate intentional entry or refusal.

No valid demand or notice. The speaker may lack authority, the command may be ambiguous, clause 8 may lack both required commands, or delivery may be unproved.

Claim of right or consent. Ownership, tenancy, lease, easement, invitation, employment, official duty, event access, or later permission may defeat an element.

Posting or location defect. The property may not qualify, signs may not meet size or placement rules, the accused may have remained on a public right-of-way, or the boundary may be uncertain.

Emergency or statutory exception. Clause 4 expressly excepts emergencies, and specialized provisions contain permissions, business-licensee rules, or affirmative defenses.

Constitutional or evidentiary defect. Retaliatory exclusion, viewpoint discrimination, unlawful detention, unreliable identification, hearsay, missing video, and improper multiple punishment can require litigation.

Frequently asked questions