What Minnesota Statutes section 609.79 actually prohibits

Section 609.79 is captioned “Obscene or harassing telephone calls.” The caption is only a label. The operative text contains several separate theories, and a criminal complaint should identify which one the prosecutor intends to prove.

The first theory applies when a person, by telephone, makes a comment, request, suggestion, or proposal that is “obscene, lewd, or lascivious.” That clause focuses on the content of a telephone communication. Its constitutional reach requires careful analysis because the First Amendment protects a great deal of crude, offensive, sexual, and upsetting speech.

The second theory applies when a person, with intent to harass or intimidate another person, repeatedly makes telephone calls, whether or not a conversation occurs. Repetition and intent are not enough by themselves. The calls must also place the other person in reasonable fear of substantial bodily harm, place that person in reasonable fear that a family or household member will suffer substantial bodily harm, or cause or be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress.

The third theory applies when a person, with intent to harass or intimidate someone at the called or notified number, makes or causes another person’s telephone to repeatedly or continuously ring or receive electronic notifications. It uses the same three result alternatives involving reasonable fear or substantial emotional distress.

A final theory reaches a person who has control of a telephone and knowingly permits it to be used for a prohibited purpose. This is not automatic liability for the account holder, parent, employer, or owner. Control, knowledge, permission, and an underlying prohibited use all matter.

Every violation under section 609.79 is classified as a misdemeanor. That classification should not obscure the consequences. A criminal case can produce arrest or citation records, bail conditions, a no-contact order, probation, employment concerns, immigration questions, and evidence used in a family-court or restraining-order proceeding.

The first defense task is therefore simple but important: make the State commit to its statutory theory. A complaint that mixes an offensive comment, several calls, ringing, texts, and relationship history into one narrative can hide missing elements. Each theory must be tested on its own language.

Obscene, lewd, or lascivious telephone comments

Clause (i) concerns a “comment, request, suggestion or proposal” made by telephone that is obscene, lewd, or lascivious. It does not use the express intent-and-result language found in the repeated-call clauses. Because it regulates speech according to content, constitutional limits are especially important.

In ordinary conversation, people often use “obscene” to mean profane, disgusting, indecent, sexually explicit, or deeply offensive. Constitutional obscenity is much narrower. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), the United States Supreme Court described a three-part test addressing whether the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest under contemporary community standards; depicts defined sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and, taken as a whole, “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”

A prosecutor should not be allowed to replace that demanding constitutional analysis with a witness’s understandable disgust. A sexual insult, proposition, joke, anatomical term, profanity, or graphic description may be offensive without satisfying the legal standard for unprotected obscenity. Context and the communication as a whole matter.

The medium also matters. The statute says “by means of a telephone.” A live call and a voicemail plainly use a telephone. A text, social-media message, email, application notification, or internet post may implicate other statutes, but the State must still prove that the communication fits the clause it charged. The legislature expressly mentioned electronic notifications in clause (iii), not in every clause.

Consent or prior sexual conversation can be relevant to context, identity, and what the words meant, but it is not a license for every later communication. Conversely, the fact that a recipient did not welcome a remark does not establish constitutional obscenity. The issue is the actual words, their setting, the whole communication, and the governing legal definition.

When the alleged words are disputed, the defense should demand the recording, voicemail file, transcript, screenshots, metadata, and original device. A paraphrase in a police report can omit qualifiers, sarcasm, a quotation, or surrounding conversation. If there is no recording, the case may turn on credibility and corroboration.

Clause (i) should also be distinguished from threats. A threat of violence may be charged under a different statute and analyzed under different First Amendment rules. A sexually explicit comment is not necessarily a threat; a threat need not be sexually explicit. Precise charging matters.

Repeated telephone calls made to harass or intimidate

Clause (ii) addresses repeated calls, including calls in which no conversation occurs. It contains three major requirements: repeated telephone calls, an intent to harass or intimidate, and one of the specified fear or distress results.

The statute does not assign a magic number to “repeatedly.” More than one contact is ordinarily necessary, but number alone does not decide the case. Two calls in seconds after a dropped connection are different from a series of calls at 2:00 a.m. after the recipient demanded no contact. Return calls, emergency calls, accidental redials, shared-business communications, and attempts to address a child exchange can all require context.

The phrase “whether or not conversation ensues” allows the State to rely on unanswered calls, hang-ups, or calls sent to voicemail. It does not erase the other elements. The prosecutor still must connect the accused to the calls, prove the intent to harass or intimidate, and prove a statutory result.

“Harass” and “intimidate” are not proved merely because the recipient felt annoyed or offended. Intent concerns what the caller meant to accomplish. A legitimate purpose does not automatically defeat a charge if the manner and circumstances show a prohibited intent, but purpose, timing, content, and efforts to use reasonable alternatives are significant evidence.

Common factual disputes include repeated calls between former partners, co-parents, family members, neighbors, customers, debtors, employees, and business owners. A relationship history can explain the communications, but it cannot substitute for proof about the charged calls.

Call logs need careful reading. A phone can record outbound attempts, completed calls, blocked calls, Wi-Fi calls, application calls, and calls routed through another service differently. Screenshots may show only selected entries. Carrier records can provide dates, times, numbers, and duration, but usually do not establish who physically used a device or what was said.

The result requirement is a major limit. Even deliberate nuisance calls do not automatically satisfy clause (ii). The calls must create one of the fears specified in the statute or cause, or reasonably be expected to cause, substantial emotional distress as the statute defines that phrase.

Repeated ringing and electronic notifications

Clause (iii) covers a related but distinct form of conduct. A person may violate it by making or causing another person’s telephone to repeatedly or continuously ring or receive electronic notifications, with intent to harass or intimidate someone at the called or notified number and with a required fear or distress result.

This language can address more than traditional dialing. Depending on the technology and proof, allegations may involve repeated texts, application alerts, automated calls, account-verification prompts, delivery notifications, group-message activity, or using third-party services to generate alerts. The statutory connection to a telephone still must be shown.

“Makes or causes” allows the State to allege indirect conduct. A person need not personally press the call button each time if the person intentionally uses an automated system or directs another person or service to generate the calls or alerts. Causation, however, cannot be assumed from motive or account ownership.

Automation creates attribution problems. Password resets, fraud alerts, calendar reminders, subscription systems, security tools, marketing services, and malfunctioning applications can generate repeated notifications without a user intending each one. Logs should identify the initiating account, IP address, device, time, authentication event, and service behavior.

A group message can produce notifications based on the recipient’s settings and the conduct of multiple participants. Reactions, replies, application updates, and synchronization across devices may multiply alerts. The number of notifications on one screen is not necessarily the number of acts committed by the accused.

As with clause (ii), the State must prove intent and a statutory result. Repeated alerts may be irritating and still fall short of substantial emotional distress. On the other hand, repeated notifications paired with threats, surveillance, impersonation, or escalation can supply powerful circumstantial evidence. The entire sequence must be preserved and evaluated.

Blocking does not always end notifications. Shared accounts, hidden caller identification, new numbers, email-to-text gateways, cloud services, and linked devices can complicate the source. A defense investigation should reconstruct the technology rather than accept a screen display at face value.

Knowingly permitting another person to use a telephone

Section 609.79 also covers a person who has control of a telephone and knowingly permits the telephone to be used for a purpose prohibited by the statute. This provision prevents a person from avoiding responsibility merely by handing the phone to someone else. It does not impose guilt based only on ownership.

“Control” is a factual question. The account subscriber, device owner, employer, parent, renter, or person holding the phone may or may not control its use at the relevant time. Shared family plans and workplace accounts are particularly poor substitutes for proof.

“Knowingly permits” requires awareness and permission. A stolen phone, borrowed phone used outside the agreed purpose, child’s secret use, compromised account, remote access, or use after an instruction to stop may defeat that element. Later learning about a call is not the same as knowingly allowing it beforehand or while it occurred.

The State must also prove that the permitted use was for a purpose prohibited in subdivision 1(1). If the alleged caller did not commit one of the covered acts, the person controlling the phone did not knowingly permit a prohibited purpose under this theory.

Evidence may include messages arranging the call, statements made during it, speakerphone participation, physical proximity, shared motives, prior conduct, device access, and admissions. Mere presence or a close relationship with the caller is not enough.

A person should not speculate when police ask who used a shared phone. Device extraction, login information, location data, witness accounts, and the communication itself may answer the question more reliably. An inaccurate guess can become an alleged admission or a separate credibility problem.

Reasonable fear and substantial emotional distress

The repeated-call and repeated-ringing clauses require one of three results. The conduct must place the recipient in reasonable fear of substantial bodily harm; place the recipient in reasonable fear that a family or household member will suffer substantial bodily harm; or cause or be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress.

Fear has both factual and objective dimensions. The person’s response matters, but the statute uses “reasonable fear.” Prior violence, threats, stalking, access to weapons, location knowledge, and escalating conduct can make fear reasonable. A generalized dislike of the caller or unsupported worry may not.

“Substantial bodily harm” is more serious than any physical discomfort. Minnesota’s general definition in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2026) includes bodily injury involving temporary but substantial disfigurement, temporary but substantial loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ, or a fracture. The call statute asks about reasonable fear of that degree of harm, not proof that an injury actually occurred.

For emotional distress, section 609.79 incorporates the definition in Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(a)(4) (2026). “Substantial emotional distress” means mental distress, suffering, or anguish demonstrated by the victim’s response. The nonexclusive examples include seeking psychotherapy, losing sleep or appetite, receiving a mental-health diagnosis, experiencing suicidal ideation, or having difficulty concentrating that causes lost productivity.

The definition does not require therapy or a diagnosis in every case, and the listed examples are not an automatic checklist. The State should present evidence that distinguishes substantial distress from ordinary anger, irritation, embarrassment, relationship conflict, or temporary upset.

The phrase “causes or would reasonably be expected to cause” permits an objective theory even when the alleged recipient’s reaction is disputed or incompletely documented. It does not eliminate proof. The prosecution must show why these communications, in context, would reasonably be expected to produce distress of the defined magnitude.

Medical and counseling evidence can raise privacy and causation questions. Preexisting anxiety, grief, work stress, another person’s conduct, or a separate event may contribute to symptoms. The defense should not demean a complainant’s mental health; it should examine whether the State can prove the statutory degree and causal connection fairly.

How intent to harass or intimidate is proved and challenged

People rarely announce a criminal intent. Prosecutors usually rely on circumstantial evidence: the words used, number and timing of calls, blocked caller identification, new numbers after blocking, prior warnings, threats, impersonation, relationship history, and what the caller did before and after.

Minnesota treats statutory intent language seriously. In State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72–76 (Minn. 1996), the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed a predecessor stalking law and the legislature’s use of language indicating specific intent. The current telephone statute now expressly requires intent to harass or intimidate for clauses (ii) and (iii). Orsello did not construe today’s amended text, but its insistence on honoring mens rea remains instructive.

Legitimate explanations may include arranging parenting time, responding to an emergency, reporting a safety issue, seeking return of property, conducting business, collecting information, correcting a misunderstanding, or continuing a conversation the recipient was also pursuing. A legitimate subject does not excuse threatening or intentionally harassing execution, but it may create reasonable doubt about purpose.

Mutual contact matters. If both people repeatedly called, texted, argued, reconciled, and restarted the exchange, a curated screenshot can create a misleading account. Mutuality does not make threats lawful and does not prevent one participant from forming criminal intent. It does require the complete chronology.

Intoxication, anger, mental illness, and impulsivity do not automatically defeat intent. Minnesota law sharply limits voluntary-intoxication defenses, and poor judgment is not the same as lack of intent. Still, the evidence must prove the particular intent charged, not merely that the defendant was upset.

Statements to police often become the State’s best intent evidence. “I wanted her to know how it felt,” “I kept calling until he answered,” or “I used a different number because I was blocked” may be interpreted as admissions. A person has the right to decline questioning and obtain counsel rather than improvise an explanation under stress.

The defense should propose a precise jury instruction that tracks the charged clause. An instruction that treats intent, repetition, or the harm result as optional can collapse a narrow law into a general ban on unwanted communication.

Phone records, recordings, screenshots, and digital attribution

These cases are often described as simple “he said, she said” disputes. Modern evidence can make them technically complex. The key issues may be who controlled an account, what a service logged, whether a screenshot is complete, how a notification was generated, and whether a recording was altered.

Carrier records can identify connections between numbers, time, duration, towers, and account information. They usually cannot identify the speaker or supply the words of an ordinary call. Internet calling, masked numbers, forwarded calls, dual-SIM phones, Wi-Fi calling, and applications can make the visible number unreliable.

Caller identification can be spoofed. Spoofing does not prove innocence in every case, but a displayed number is not conclusive attribution. Investigators should seek provider records, originating IP information, device artifacts, payment records, and account access logs where available.

Voicemails and recordings should be preserved in native form. The original file may contain timestamps, encoding information, and other metadata lost in a screen recording or forwarded copy. Voice familiarity can support identification, but accent, audio quality, imitation, and synthetic audio may require closer analysis.

Minnesota generally permits a participant to record a conversation under Minn. Stat. § 626A.02, subd. 2(d) (2026), unless the recording is made for committing a criminal or tortious act. Interstate calls can involve another jurisdiction’s law. Admissibility, authentication, completeness, and constitutional issues remain separate questions.

Screenshots are useful but incomplete. They can be cropped, reordered, mislabeled, edited, or detached from surrounding messages. A screenshot does not reveal every linked device or deleted item. Device extraction, cloud backups, export files, and records from both sides can supply context.

Police may ask for consent to search a phone or seek a warrant. A search authorization should identify the device, accounts, time period, and categories of data supported by probable cause. An overbroad digital search can expose years of private information unrelated to the allegation.

Preservation must be lawful. Do not guess passwords, access another person’s account, install monitoring software, or persuade a witness to change evidence. Counsel can send preservation requests, obtain records through discovery or subpoena, and retain a qualified examiner when attribution is genuinely disputed.

First Amendment limits and Minnesota appellate principles

The First Amendment does not immunize true threats, constitutionally defined obscenity, or criminal conduct merely because words are involved. It does protect speech that is unpopular, indecent, rude, unsettling, or emotionally painful unless the State satisfies a valid and sufficiently narrow criminal law.

In State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 174–80 (Minn. 2017), the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated a different disorderly-conduct provision because it swept too broadly. The court explained that a law is substantially overbroad when, in addition to reaching unprotected speech, it prohibits “a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.”

Hensel did not decide section 609.79. It supplies the controlling caution against treating a listener’s disturbance as enough when protected expression is involved. The telephone statute’s post-2020 intent and harm elements for repeated calls help narrow those clauses, and courts should enforce every one of them.

The obscene-comment clause presents a different issue. Miller supplies the federal constitutional framework for obscenity. The State should not use the clause to punish mere vulgarity or an unwanted sexual statement without addressing that framework. Nor should a court invent missing words to save an application that the text and Constitution do not support.

Context remains essential. A threat, course of stalking, disclosure of private sexual images, or repeated conduct targeted at one person can involve unprotected conduct or separately punishable acts. Political advocacy, consumer complaints, labor communications, satire, art, consensual adult conversation, and ordinary disputes may involve strong constitutional protection.

A First Amendment defense is not a slogan. Counsel should identify the charged words or expressive acts, the exact statutory clause, whether the law is challenged on its face or as applied, the protected category involved, and the remedy requested. The record should contain the complete communication rather than a prosecution-selected phrase.

Courts also distinguish a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the statute from a claim that the State failed to prove facts. A defendant may argue both: the alleged speech remains constitutionally protected, and the evidence fails to prove identity, intent, repetition, or harm.

Why Minnesota’s 2020 amendment matters

The current language cannot be understood safely from an old article, old complaint form, or pre-2020 case. Laws 2020, chapter 96 amended section 609.79 as part of a broader revision of harassment laws.

Before the amendment, the repeated-call language focused on calls made with intent to abuse, disturb, or cause distress. The current clauses instead require intent to harass or intimidate and one of the defined fear or substantial-distress results. The legislature also expressly included electronic notifications in the ringing provision and expanded venue language for wireless or electronic communications.

Those changes were substantive safeguards, not cosmetic edits. A charging document, probable-cause argument, plea petition, or jury instruction that relies on the old formulation risks omitting present elements.

Older appellate decisions may still illuminate general principles, but their statutory quotations cannot be copied into a current analysis without checking the amendment. A case affirming a conviction under a former version does not automatically establish what the State must prove now.

The date of alleged conduct controls the applicable version. A continuing dispute that spans the effective date may require separating calls by date and matching each alleged act to the law then in force. Ex post facto principles bar retroactive use of a later criminal expansion.

For present charges, counsel should use the authenticated current statute, identify the exact alternatives in the complaint, and insist that the factfinder decide every current element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Related charges in telephone and harassment cases

The same course of communication may produce charges under more than one law. Minnesota’s harassment statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (2026), is a common companion. It classifies certain intentional harassment as a gross misdemeanor and lists repeated calls, texts, ringing, and electronic deliveries among the covered acts. Its charging language, penalties, and enhancement provisions differ from section 609.79.

Repeated electronic letters, messages, or packages may implicate Minn. Stat. § 609.795 (2026). That law also uses intent and fear or substantial-distress requirements for repeated deliveries. Prosecutors should not multiply charges without identifying a distinct statutory act and permissible unit of prosecution.

A communication threatening a crime of violence may be charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.713 (2026). Threat cases raise questions about the words, context, speaker’s mental state, and whether the communication qualifies as a true threat.

Taking away, damaging, disabling, or interfering with a telephone or communication device during an emergency call can implicate Minn. Stat. § 609.78 (2026). That is different from making harassing calls.

Using another person’s identity, accessing an account without authorization, nonconsensually sharing private sexual images, coercing a sexual act, or violating an order can trigger additional charges. The facts—not the label “phone harassment”—determine which provisions apply.

When multiple counts arise from one behavioral incident, Minnesota’s protection against multiple punishment under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2026) may affect sentencing. That analysis is fact-specific and is not a rule that all communication counts merge.

Related charges can radically increase exposure. A section 609.79 misdemeanor should not be evaluated in isolation if the complaint alleges harassment, threats, order violations, domestic abuse, stalking, or digital intrusion.

Harassment restraining orders, protection orders, and no-contact conditions

A criminal complaint is not the only legal response to unwanted telephone contact. A person may seek a harassment restraining order under Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2026). In a qualifying domestic relationship, an order for protection under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2026) may also be sought.

Civil and criminal standards differ. The denial or dismissal of one matter does not automatically decide the other. Evidence, burdens of proof, available relief, and definitions can vary. Statements made at a civil hearing may later be used in a criminal investigation.

After a charge, a judge may impose a domestic-abuse no-contact order, ordinary no-contact condition, geographic restriction, or prohibition on direct and indirect communication. The written order controls. A recipient’s invitation to talk does not necessarily authorize contact or protect the restrained person from arrest.

Indirect contact can include using a friend, child, relative, coworker, social-media post, shared application, payment memo, gift, or new number to convey a message. Necessary communication about children or property should occur only through a method expressly allowed by the order or approved by the court.

Violating a restraining or protection order may be a separate crime with consequences more serious than the original allegation. Do not test an ambiguous order. Counsel can seek clarification or modification in court.

A criminal defense strategy should account for parallel family-court and civil proceedings. The immediate urge to tell one’s side at every hearing can create sworn testimony before criminal discovery is complete. Coordinated advice protects both matters.

Common defense issues in a section 609.79 case

Wrong person or weak attribution. A number, account, or device may be associated with the accused without proving who initiated a call or notification. Shared devices, spoofing, compromised accounts, forwarding, automated systems, and mistaken voice identification should be investigated.

No repetition. Clauses (ii) and (iii) require repeated or continuous conduct. A single call, one notification, or duplicate display of the same event may not satisfy that element. Clause (i), however, can involve one alleged obscene communication.

No intent to harass or intimidate. The contact may have had a legitimate or mixed purpose. Complete communications, mutual contact, emergencies, parenting obligations, work duties, and efforts to use reasonable channels can create reasonable doubt.

No statutory result. Annoyance or ordinary distress is not necessarily reasonable fear of substantial bodily harm or substantial emotional distress. The prosecutor must prove the result chosen in the complaint.

Protected speech or speech outside legal obscenity. A crude or sexually explicit statement is not automatically unprotected obscenity. The whole communication, Miller framework, and Minnesota overbreadth principles may be decisive.

Incomplete or altered evidence. Cropped screenshots, edited recordings, missing earlier messages, inconsistent timestamps, selected call-log entries, and lost metadata can affect authenticity, completeness, and weight.

Lack of control, knowledge, or permission. An account holder is not automatically responsible for another user. Subdivision 1(2) requires control and knowing permission for a prohibited use.

Constitutional search or interrogation issues. An unlawful phone search, overbroad warrant, custodial interrogation without required warnings, or involuntary statement may support suppression. Suppression depends on how evidence was obtained, not simply whether it is damaging.

Charging and unanimity problems. When many calls and statutory alternatives are presented, the complaint and jury instructions must identify the criminal act and theory with enough precision to protect notice and a unanimous verdict.

No defense should be selected from a generic list. The most effective approach usually begins with a minute-by-minute chronology, the native digital evidence, the exact statutory clause, and an honest assessment of facts that help and hurt.

Misdemeanor penalty, venue, limitations, records, and expungement

Section 609.79 classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Under Minn. Stat. § 609.03(3) (2026), the maximum misdemeanor sentence is 90 days in jail, a $1,000 fine, or both. A maximum is not a prediction. Criminal history, facts, victim input, plea negotiations, local practice, and probation conditions affect the actual outcome.

Probation conditions may include no contact, counseling or assessment, lawful use of electronic communications, device restrictions, restitution, and compliance with related orders. A court must have a lawful basis for conditions, and the wording should be clear enough to follow.

Section 609.79 contains its own venue rule. A case may be prosecuted where a call was made or received. For wireless or electronic communication, venue may also lie where the sender or receiver resides. Venue must still be supported by facts; it is not a license to file anywhere connected to the relationship.

Most misdemeanor prosecutions are subject to the general three-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 628.26 (2026). Tolling and the date prosecution begins can complicate the calculation, so an old allegation should be reviewed rather than assumed barred.

Section 609.79 is listed as a targeted misdemeanor for identification purposes under Minn. Stat. § 299C.10 (2026). That classification can affect fingerprinting and criminal-history identification even though the offense remains a misdemeanor.

Restitution may be requested for qualifying losses under Minn. Stat. § 611A.04 (2026). A defendant can challenge causation, amount, documentation, and procedure. Emotional harm does not authorize every requested expense automatically.

A conviction may later qualify for statutory expungement if the requirements and waiting period in Minn. Stat. § 609A.02 (2026) are met. Dismissals and favorable resolutions can have different expungement rules. Expungement is valuable but is not identical to erasing every private record or making the event legally nonexistent.

What to do after an accusation or police contact

Stop nonessential contact immediately. If an order or release condition exists, follow it exactly. Do not respond because the complainant calls first, asks for an apology, or says the case will be dropped. Only the court can change a court order.

Preserve evidence without editing it. Save the whole call history, complete message threads, voicemail files, account emails, login alerts, cloud records, billing records, and linked-device information. Photograph relevant screens, but keep the underlying device and native data.

Write a confidential chronology for counsel identifying each contact, its purpose, who was present, devices used, prior requests for contact, blocks or account changes, and any related civil order. Do not post the chronology or send it to friends.

Do not delete embarrassing material. Deletion can eliminate exculpatory context, look like consciousness of guilt, violate a preservation duty, or impair forensic recovery. Do not factory-reset, trade in, discard, or update a device without advice.

Do not ask another person to contact the complainant, obtain a recantation, or coordinate an explanation. Third-party communication can violate an order or become an allegation of witness tampering or additional harassment.

You may decline a police interview and request a lawyer. A calm, accurate account is still an admission if it supplies identity, intent, or context the State could not otherwise prove. Counsel can assess the evidence before deciding whether any statement is useful.

Early legal work can matter even in a misdemeanor. Preserving provider data, securing surveillance, identifying shared-device users, documenting mutual communications, and addressing a civil order are often time-sensitive. The goal is not to minimize the accusation; it is to test it under the law that actually applies.

Frequently asked questions about obscene or harassing calls in Minnesota